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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Under the technical direction of the Combat Damage Assessment
Committee (CDAC) , the Combat Damage Assessment Team (CDAT) conducted
test firings of the A-10/GAU-8 weapons system on 2 February 1979.
The purpose of the test was to evaluate the effects of the GAU-8
30mm API anti-tank ammunition (LAVP lot number OL78D043-016 , Honeywell)
against realistically simulated Soviet Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) . The
tests were conducted against an array of 31 MBTs and four simulated
ZSU-2 3/4 targets, deployed for an attack. The array simulated a
three-company Soviet Tank Battalion with Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA)
support. M-47 tanks loaded with 90mm TP ammunition, diesel fuel,
lubricating oil, and crew manikins were used to simulate Soviet MBTs.
Plywood mock-ups were used to simulate ZSU-23/4s. The pilots of the
five A-10 aircraft used in the firings conducted their attacks at low
altitudes and low dive angles thus simulating approach and attack
below the altitude of effective engagement by the opposing air defense
(AD) network and its fire control radar. The exercise included seven
initial firing passes at relatively long range (approximately 6000
feet) against four simulated ZSU-23/4 targets in the Soviet tank
formation, followed by shorter range firings on the tank targets.
The CDAC assessed the results of the firings against the tanks
as follows:
Attack Parameters
The pilots of the attacking aircraft fired against the tank
array at low dive angles from 10 frontal and 20 rear aspects. The
attacks resulted in high obliquity impacts averaging 55 degrees from
normal on the side surfaces of the hulls and turrets of the tanks. See
Figure 6 for the layout of the tanks on the simulated battlefield
including the locations of companies A, B, and C in the Soviet tank
battalion and a graphic view of the high obliquities offered by the side
surfaces of the tanks.
Five A-10 aircraft attacked Company A from a left frontal aspect
averaging 321 degrees (0 degrees taken as front of tank with angles
measured clockwise) . The attack aspect chosen by the pilots was un-
desirable from the viewpoint of inflicting catastrophic damage on the
target tanks. Castastrophic damage results almost entirely from the
internal effects of perforating projectiles. The projectiles fired
at the frontal aspects, however, were presented with (1) the heavily
armored frontal surfaces of the hulls and turrets, and (2) the less
heavily armored side surfaces at high obliquities averaging approximately
51 degrees from the normal. The combination of heavy frontal armor
and high side obliquities resulted in a low average of 0.04 perforations
per impact and the absence of any K-kills in Company A. The pilots
of the attacking aircraft, however, compensated for the undesirable
attack aspect by accurate shooting at effective open fire ranges and
impacted the 10 tanks of the company with 366 projectiles. The pilots
accomplished the results under realistic conditions of battlefield
obscuration and destroyed the simulated Soviet tank company by
cumulative external effects resulting in the assessment of eight 100%
mobility kills.
Two A-10 aircraft attacked Company B from a right rear attack
aspect averaging 154 degrees. The attack aspect chosen by the pilots
was desirable from the viewpoint of inflicting catastrophic and
mobility damage on Soviet T-62 tanks and probably later model tanks,
e.g., T-72, T-80. The attack aspect was less desirable from the view-
point of inflicting catastrophic damage on the M-4 7 tanks used in the
test because of the uniquely exaggerated overhang at the rear of the
turret and the large stowage box attached in turn on the overhang.
Unlike the present M60A1 105mm gun tanks which have a large but rela-
tively less pronounced overhang, unenclosed stowage bins, and carry
23 rounds of 105mm ammunition in the overhang, the M-47 overhang
configuration includes no ammunition and serves as a protective spaced
array of inert material. The projectiles fired at the right rear aspec
thus were presented with (1) the spaced array at the rear of the tur-
ret shielding crew and ammunition in the fighting compartment, and
(2) the side surfaces of the turrets and hulls at high obliquities
averaging 64 degrees from the normal. The combination of the spaced
array and exceptionally high side obliquities contributed to a
moderately effective average of 0.11 perforations per impact and the
fact that only one tank was catastrophically destroyed in the company.
The pilots of the attacking aircraft, however, compensated for the
unique toughness of the rear of the M-47 turret and the high side
obliquities by placing an average of 26 projectiles on each of the
eight tanks which were impacted in Company B (one tank was missed
and one tank was not attacked) . The large average number of impacts
from the right rear aspect included perforations into the engine
compartment and cumulative damage to the external suspension system
which resulted in six 100 percent mobility kills in addition to the
catastrophic kill.
Two A-10 aircraft attacked Company C from a left rear attack
aspect averaging 225 degrees. As in the case of Company C, the pilots
chose an attack aspect which was moderately desirable from the view-
point of inflicting catastrophic damage on Soviet T-62 tanks but
less desirable for causing catastrophic damage to M-47 tanks. The
pilots compensated for the moderately desirable attack aspect from the
viewpoint of catastrophic damage by relatively short accurate bursts
at close range impacting all ten tanks, placing 336 projectiles on
target, and causing six 100 percent mobility kills, two 100 percent
firepower kills, and one catastrophic kill.
Weapon Effects
The pilots of the A-10 aircraft fired an estimated 2592 rounds
in approximately 6 minutes while making 30 passes against 30 different
tanks. They achieved a total of 921 impacts consisting of 85 per-
forations through the armored envelopes and 8 32 hits on various
exterior surfaces and components. The ratio of impacts to total
rounds fired (921/2592) was 0.36, and the ratio of perforations to
impacts (85/921) was 0.092. The pilots also made seven firing passes
at the four simulated ZSU-23/4 self propelled guns of the Soviet tank
battalion at ranges of engagement beyond those effective for the air
defense cannons. Every simulated ZSU-23/4 was impacted by projectiles
from the attacking aircraft, and the single target which did not burn
was observed to have nine impacts on it.
Damage Assessment
The pilots of the A-10 aircraft attacked the simulated Soviet
tank battalion for approximately six minutes and caused the following
damage
:
(1) From the overall viewpoint of the battalion . Within six
minutes of the time of the opening of the air attack against
the tanks proper, the Soviet tank battalion, simulated by combat
loaded M-47 tanks, was destroyed as an effective combat unit. The
CDAT based its assessment of the destruction of the battalion on the
following physically observed results:
(a) Seventy-one percent of the tank strength of the battalion
was totally immobilized due to various combinations of internal fires
and explosions, crew casualties, transmission, engine, and fuel tank
damage, and cumulative damage to exterior suspension components. Every
totally immobilized tank also suffered either total or significant
firepower damage.
(b) An additional 13 percent of the tank strength of the
battalion suffered damage resulting in the total loss of firepower.
(2_) From the viewpoint of the individual tanks . The most note-
worthy positive damage effects were those leading to the assessment of
20 100% M-Kills. Such damage comprised crew casualties and destruction
of interior and exterior mobility components, e.g., engines, trans-
mission, final drives, road wheels, road wheel hubs, track connectors,
etc. The most noteworthy negative damage effects were those associated
with K-Kills. Many of the tanks were impacted by projectiles which
perforated the internal diesel fuel tanks but failed to cause fires
which in turn would have catastrophically damaged the tanks. The CDAT
takes the position that the number of K-Kills was unrealistically low
due to the following challenges in test realism:
(a) The diesel fuel and lubricating oil in the target tanks
could not be maintained at realistic temperatures and pressures for
tanks with engines running. The actual temperature of the material
was at the unrealistically low value of approximately 28 F during the

winter firing test. The temperature of the diesel fuel next to hot
engine components would have been considerably greater as would the
temperature of the oil. The higher temperatures would have increased
significantly the susceptibility of the fuel and oil to ignition by
increasing the vapor pressure in any area exposed to air.
(b) The diesel fuel could not be simulated as realistically
in movement, i.e., sloshing around, during the firing test thus




The target tanks were positioned in open, flat desert terrain
with no cover and little concealment. Aerial weather conditions were
excellent, with unlimited ceiling and visibility. Shortly after the
initial firing, clouds of white dust from projectile impacts were
evident. Such conditions effectively simulated the actual target
obscuration which would have been encountered by pilots in combat.
Overall Comments on Results
The CDAT assessed an average probability of tank neutraliza-
tion (total loss of mobility or firepower) per pass of 87%. This
was based on 26 tanks neutralized after 30 passes. Individual asses-
sments, contained in Table I, show that after A-10 attacks, the bulk
of the simulated tank battalion was immobilized, and its combat power
reduced by 87%. The distribution of these losses (9 tanks in
Company A, 8 tanks in Company B, and 9 tanks in Company C indicates
that considerable delay for the reorganization of battle-effective
tanks and crews would be involved before the battalion could continue
its mission at greatly reduced strength.
The kills which were achieved can be attributed to fires and
explosions caused by perforated fuel tanks or cartridge cases, damage
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To generate realistic data, the CDAC/CDAT teams employed an
empirical technique of destructive testing of actual target tanks,
Accordingly, the experimental setup of 2 February, 1979 involved
an attack by the A-10/GAU-8 systems upon a multi-target, tacti-
cally arrayed tank formation simulating a three-company Soviet
tank battalion. Except for following an established tactical
doctrine, no constraints were placed upon the attacking pilots in
order to ensure maximum realism possible. Table 2 lists factors
that would have been ideal in that test, and the practical set up
that was achieved.
SIMULATED GROUND COMBAT SITUATION
The firing test of 2 February, 1979 simulated the attack by
five A-10 aircraft against a Soviet tank battalion. The CDAC
hypothesized the Soviet tank battalion to be composed of three ten-
tank companies, and a battalion commander's tank. Upon meeting
heavy resistance, the battalion deployed into an appropriate com-
bat formation to reduce resistance, and to form an optimum base
for offensive action.
A Soviet tank battalion, which is simulated in the firing
test, would probably have other units attached to it for support.
Such units might include any or all of the following elements:
(1) motorized rifle company (2) engineer detachment (3) chemical
defense specialists (4) 122mm howitzer battery (5) and air defense
support elements simulated in this test by four plywood ZSU-23/4
mockups. The tank formation was arranged with one company in
front and two in the rear, simulating an initial assault posture
The targets used in the firing test were US M-47 tanks, largely
intact, containing crew manikins, and stowed with ammunition,
fuel, and oil. The tanks were not maneuvered during the firing
test; the formation remained essentiallly a stationary snapshot of
the battalion.
TABLE 2. Comparison of Ideal & Practical Test Conditions
Ideal
Test Parameters
1. Air Attack Realism
a. Actual A-10/GAU-8
configuration
b. 30mm APIT ammunition




e. Low altitude attack
angle (<-6 degrees)
2. Air Defense Realism
a. Automatic cannon
firing at aircraft
b. Missile systems firing
at aircraft
c. Small arms firing at
aircraft
d. AD suppression by
aircraft
3. Threat Targets and Doctrine
a. Soviet T62/T64/T72 high
fidelity tank targets
b. Combat loads, stowed
in Soviet T62/T64/T72 tanks










Air Attack Real ism
a. Actual A-10/GAU-8
configuration
b. 30mm APIT ammunition




e. Low altitude attack
angle (-3.23 degrees
average)
2. Air Defense Realism
a. Low altitude, low angle,
minimum exposure attacks
against assumed AD system
b. Low altitude, low angle,
minimum exposure attacks
against assumed AD system
c. Low altitude, low angle,
minimum exposure attacks
against assumed AD system
d. Suppression of four (4)
simulated ZSU-23/4 tar-
gets at an average 6,000
feet open-fire range.
3. Threat Targets and Doctr ine
a. Soviet tanks, simulated
by US M-47 tanks
b. Combat loads, stowed
in US M-47 tanks
c. Wooden crew manikins
d. Static combat formation
e. Stationary targets
TARGET TANKS
The most effective targets, available in sufficient numbers
to simulate Soviet T-55 and T-62 (Figure 1) tanks were the US M-47
tanks. Both Soviet tank models are similar in armor protection to
the M-47. With appropriate purging of the gasoline fuel system of
the US tanks, the CDAT managed to field a target similar in survi-
vability to the T-55 and T-62 tanks in terms of their ignitable
internal material. Few data are available on the armor protec-
tion, and the arrangement of internal components in the Soviet
T-64 and later model tanks. The decision was made, accordingly,
to simulate the earlier model Soviet tanks with the readily
available US tanks.
The M-47 tanks, used as targets, were in excellent condition
for damage assessment. The exterior components were complete, and
the tanks have proven to be effective targets for assessment of
exterior mobility damage. Interior components were less complete.
All of the most essential items were present, e.g., main gun,
engine, transmission, fuel tanks, ammunition racks, etc., but
other items such as oil coolers, range finders, vision devices,
and radios, were not uniformly installed in all tanks.
The following sensitive internal items which contributed to
catastrophic kills, and to high percentage M- and F-kills were
placed in test tanks:
Generic Sensitive Item Test Item
1. Ammunition US Cartridge, 90-mm TP-T
2. Fuel Number 2 Diesel
3. Oil Oil in Engine, Transmission
and Drive Components.
4. Personnel Articulated Plywood
Manikins
TEST RESULTS
Tests consisted of exposing the ammunition, gun, aircraft,
pilots, and combat-arrayed and loaded tanks to several minutes of
combat simulation. The key elements in the scenario were:
1. 30mm API ammunition, Honeywell lot number OL78D043-016
.
2. General Electric GAU-8 Gatling gun.
3. Fairchild Republic A-1U ground support aircraft.
4. USAF combat pilots
5. US M-47 main battle tanks, combat-loaded.
The combat simulation itself comprised the aerial fire and
appropriate maneuvers of the attacking A-10 aircraft.
Aerojet Ordnance and Manufacturing Company personnel provided
the industrial support required to repair, refurbish, and field the
tank targets. The CDAT applied research techniques required to
describe weapon effects and combat damage. The basic materiel
used in tests, i.e., aircraft, target tanks, ZSU-23/4 mockups, and
projectiles are illustrated in Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5. The targets
were arrayed in the tactical formation of a Soviet tank battalion,
shown in Figure 6.
The A-10 pilots simulated target acquisition with the help of
a forward air controller. They attacked the tanks at low angles
and below the minimum altitude required by the opposing air







FIGURE 1. Russian T62 Medium Tank
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FIGURE 3. United States M-47 Combat Tank
12
% ^"-fM*

























































The damage assessed on each tank is presented in the following
section. The tanks are arranged in order of the identification
numbers on the turrets. Data presented include the following:
Damage Assessment
Location and breakdown of Impacts Diagrammed as follows:
O Hits
/\ Perforations
Supportive Photography of Damage Assessment
No consideration was given to tanks 24 and 25, which were not
hit, and therefore are not included in the Damage Assessment
section.
Terms used in the damage assessment summaries are aefinea in
Appendix B.
Impacts on targets were numbered arbitrarily and sequentially
for identification purposes, first at the turret level, then at
the hull level. If additional impacts were discovered during the
combat damage assessment ,as was sometimes the case, they were
given the next sequential number without an attempt to correct the
sequence. THE READER IS CAUTIONED THAT THIS NUMBERING SYSTEM HAS
NO RELATIONSHIP WHATSOEVER TO THE SEQUENCE OF PROJECTILE ARRIVALS
ON THE TANK, OR TO ANY PORTION OF THE BURST IMPACTING THE TANK.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 2 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Descr iption :
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 2
with 18 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 188 degrees
(rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive angle,
while expending 107 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill, resulting from the following projectile
impacts, shown in Figure 7:
a. Perforations : 5
b. Significant Impacts *: 4
c. Insignificant Impacts*:
_J>
Total Impacts : 18
Rationale for Kill Assessment:
Five of the impacts (number
Figures 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, r
tions of the armored envelope.
Impact 6, shown in Figure 8, co
of the location of the strike,
could have resulted in a mobili
into the transmission case, or
cooler lines. Impacts 2, 3, 4,
the kill through minor damage t
system.
s 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11) shown in
espectively, achieved perfora-
Behind-the-plate effects of
uld not be determined because
The remaining perforations
ty kill through penetrations
rupture of transmission oil
and 18 made contributions to
o the track and suspension




FIGURE 7. Impact Diagram, Target 2
18
IFIGURE b. Impact Six, Target 2, Perforation of Rear Bottom
Hull Armor into Transmission Compartment.
FIGURE 9. Impact Seven, Target 2, Perforation of dean Hull
Armor ano Penetration inl ransmission
19
FIGURE 10. Impact Eight, Target 2, Perforation of Rear Hull
Armor ana Penetration into Transmission Case.
FIGURE 11. Impact Nine, Target 2, Perforation of Rear Hull
Armor ana Penetration into Transmission Case.
2
FIGURE 12. Impact Eleven, Target 2, Perforation of Rear
Hull Armor (Transmission Oil Cooler Line was
Penetrated, Causing Oil Leak).
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 4 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 4
with 12 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 193 degrees
(rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive angle,
while expending 78 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
100% M-Kill, resulting from the following projectile




Total Impacts : 12
Rationale for Kill Assessment ;
Impact 5, shown in Figure 14, destroyed the adjusting
idler hub in the left track. Two other impacts contributed to




FIGURE 13. Impact Diagram, Target 4.
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FIGURE 14. Impact Five, Target 4, Showing Destroyed Adjust-
ing Idler Hub in the Left Track.
24
TARGET TANK NUMBER 7 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Descr iption :
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 7
with 14 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 167 degrees
(rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive angle,
while expending 66 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
20% M-Kill, resulting from the following projectile




Total Impacts : 14
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
Mobility was estimated to have been degraded by 20%, due
to cumulative damage to the track and suspension system
resulting from seven hits. Impact 9, shown in Figure 16, is





















FIGURE 15. Impact Diagram, Target 7
26
FIGURE 16. Impact Nine, Target 7, Snowing Destroyed Lna
Connector, Damaged Track Shoe Pins, ana 3roken
Right Drive Sprocket.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 17 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 17
with 47 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 133 degrees
(right rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 88 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
100% K-Kill, resulting from the following projectile
impacts shown in Figure 17:
a. Perforations : 6
b. Significant Impacts : **
c. Insignificant Impacts: **
Total Impacts 47
**Omitted - Catastrophic fire and explosion overrode other
damage.
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
This target did not immediately burst into flame after the
attack pass, but was observed to be burning approximately six
minutes later.
The right side of the turret was perforated by impacts 5,
6, and 7, shown in Figures 18, 19, and 20, respectively. Any
of these impacts was capable of wounding or killing all per-
sonnel in the fighting compartmant and, possibly, of igniting
propellant of rounds stowed in the ready racks. Impact 4,
which perforated the top of the turret at the loaders station,
contributed to damage in the fighting compartment.
The rear hull was perforated by Impacts 41 and 42, which
perforated the transmission case and severed an oil cooler
line. Either of these impacts could have ignited oil in the
transmission compartment.
A small fire, which could not be extinguished by the crew
due to casualties, provides the best scenario for assessment




FIGURE 17. Impact Diagram, Target 17
29
FIGURE 18. Impact Five, Target 17, Perforation of Right
Side of Turret.









FIGURE 20. Impact Seven, Target 17, Perforation of Right
Side of Turret.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 19 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description :
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 19
with 18 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 143 degrees
(right rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 105 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill, resulting from the following projectile







Total Impacts : 18
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
Impact 8 (Figure 22) perforated the center access door at
the rear of the hull, and penetrated the transmission case.
(NOTE: The armored center access door had been replaced with
one of lesser steel thickness. CDAT judgement was that this






FIGURE 21. Impact Diagram, Target 19
33
FIGURE 22. Impact Eight, Target 1^ , Perforation of Center
Access Door into Transmission Compartment, and
Penetration into tne Transmission Case.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 20 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Descr iption ;
The attacking A-10 Aircraft impacted target tank number 20
with 19 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 128 degrees
(right side) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 59 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill, resulting from the following projectile







Total Impacts : 19
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment :
Impact 9 (Figure 24) perforated the right hull and
penetrated the right fuel tank, causing a leak. Impacts
7, 8, 13, 14, 15, and 17 contributed to the kill through
minor damage to the track and suspension system. In the
judgement of the Combat Damage Assessment Team, the hole
through the fuel tank, which was located only inches from
the bottom would have filled the space under both the engine



























FIGURE 23. Impact Diagram, Target 20
36
FIGURE 24. Impact Nine, Target 2U , Perforation of" the Hull
Armor and Penetration into the Right Fuel Tank.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 21 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description :
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 21
with 24 projectiles, fired from an aspect of 146 degrees
(right rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 108 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
75% M-Kill and 100% F-Kill resulting from the following







Total Impacts : 24
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: An overall 75% M-Kill was assessed, based pri-
marily (65%) on crew casualties (tank commander and
gunner) caused by impacts 6 and 9, shown in Figures 26 and
27, respectively, and secondarily (10%) on cumulative
damage to the track and suspension system caused by three
other impacts.
b. F-Kill: 100% F-Kill was due to crew casualties from
impacts 6 and 9, and to impact 7 (Figure 28) which jammed
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FIGURE 25. Impact Diagram, Target 21.
39
FIGURE 26. Impact Six, Target 21, Perforation into Fighting
Compartment Through Vision 3lock in Commander's
Cupola
.
FIGURE 27. Impact Nine, Target 21, Showing Destroyed
Periscooe Head at Commander's Station.
40
FIGURE 28. Impact Seven, Target 21, Showing Location of
Strike Which Jammed the Turret.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 22 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description :
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 22
with 25 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 156 degrees
(right rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 66 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill, resulting from the following projectile
impacts, shown in Figure 29:
a. Perforations
b. Significant Impacts
c. Insignificant Impacts: 17
Total Impacts : 25
Rat ionale for Kill As sessment :
The primary contributors to the kill were impacts 10 and
12, shown in Figures 30 and 31, respectively, which destroyed
the right #4 roadwheel bearing spacer and hub, damaging the
spindle; and impacts 6 and 25, shown in Figures 32 and 33,
respectively, which severely damaged the right drive sprocket
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FIGURE 30 Impact Ten, Target 22, Which Damaged the Right
Number 5 Roadwheel, Destroyed the Right Number
4 Roadwheel Bearing Spacer, and Damaged the
Spindle.
FIGURE 31. Impact Twelve, Target 22, Which Destroyed the
Right Number 4 Roadwheel Hub and Outer Bearing
44
FIGURE 32. Impact Six, Target 22, Showing Damage to Right
Drive Sprocket.
FIGURE 33 Impact Twenty-Five,
Right Drive Sprocket
Target 22, Showing Damage to
45
TARGET TANK NUMBER 2 3 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 23
with 36 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 164 degrees
(rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive angle,
while expending 1U7 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill, resulting from the following projectile





c. Insignificant Impacts: 18
Total Impacts : 36
3 . Rationale for Kill Assessment :
The target suffered four perforations. Three of the four
perforations were capable of causing a 100% M-Kill.
Impact 16 (Figure 35) perforated the rear hull armor and
penetrated the transmission thermostat and cross-over line.
Impacts lb and 21, shown in Figures 36 and 37, respectively,
perforated the rear hull armor and penetrated the transmission
case. One other perforation (Impact 13) had no behind-the-
plate effects.
Both final drives were damaged sufficiently to cause an
M-Kill. Impacts 10 and 11, shown in Figures 38 and 39,
respectively, penetrated the left final drive. Impact 25
(Figure 40) penetrated the right final drive.
Cumulative damage to the tra«»^
11 other impacts (numbers 7, 8, 9,
36 contributed to the kill)
.
ck and suspension system from
28, 29, 30, 31 , 32, 34, 35,
46
FIGURE 34. Impact Diagram, Target 23
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FIGURE 35. Impact Sixteen, Target 23, Perforation of Rear
Hull Armor into the Transmission Compartment,
Which penetrated the Transmission Thermostat
and Cross-Over Line.
FIGURE 36. Impact Eighteen, Target 23, Perforation of Rear




FIGURE 37. Impact Twenty-One, Target 23, Perforation of
Rear Hull Armor and Penetration into the Trans-
mission Case.
FIGURE 38. Impact Ten, Target 23, Penetration into the Left
Final Drive.
49
FIGURE 39. Impact Eleven, Target 23, Penetration into the
Left Final Drive.
FIGURE 40. Impact Twenty-Five, Target 23, Penetration into
the Right Final Drive.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 26 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 26
with 16 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 166 degrees
(rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive angle,
while expending lu7 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
100% M-Kill, resulting from the following projectile







Total Impacts : 16
Rationale f or Kill As sessment :
A 100% M-Kill was assessed because of Impacts 12 and 13,
shown in Figures 42 and 43, respectively, which perforated the
rear hull armor and penetrated the transmission case. Two
other impacts (4 and 6), which caused slight damage to the
track, made a minor contribution to the kill. One other hit
(Impact 9) perforated the rear hull into the transmission







FIGURE 41. Impact Diagram, Target 26
52
FIGURE 42. Impact Twelve, Target 26, Perforation of Rear
Hull Armor and Penetration into the Transmission
Case
.
FIGURE 43. Impact Thirteen, Target 26, Perforation of Rear




TARGET TANK NUMBER 27 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 27
with 14 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 19b degrees
(rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive angle,
while expending 85 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
10% M-Kill, resulting from the following projectile




Total Impacts : 14
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
A 10% M-Kill was assessed due to the impacts on the track
and suspension system. Impact 6, shown in Figure 45, is



















FIGURE 44. Impact Diagram, Target 27.
55
FIGURE 45. Impact Six, Target 27 , Showing Damage to Left
Number 2 Track Support Roller.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 28 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 28
with 53 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 237 degrees
(rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive angle,
while expending 79 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill and 95% F-Kill, resulting from the following







Total Impacts : 53
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: A 100% M-Kill was assessed because of Impact 38
(Figure 47) which perforated the left hull and penetrated
the left fuel tank, and to Impacts 34 and 44, shown in
Figures 48 and 49, respectively, which destroyed the left
#5 and #6 roadwheel hubs. Cumulative damage to the track
and suspension system from 10 other impacts contributed to
the M-Kill.
b. F-Kill: A 95% F-Kill was assessed because of casualties
caused to all crewmen in the fighting compartment by eight
perforations of the hull and turret armor. One additional





FIGURE 46. Impact Diagram, Target 2b.
FIGURE 47. Impact Thirty-Eight, Target 28, Perforation of
Hull Armor and Penetration into Left Fuel Tank
FIGURE 48. Impact Thirty-Four, Target 28, Which Destroyed
the Left Number 5 Roadwheel Hub.
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FIGURE 49. Impact Forty-Four, Target 28, Which Destroyed
the Left Number Six Roadwheel Hub.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 29 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Descr iption ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 29
with 39 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 215 degrees
(left rear) during one firing pass at low altitude and low
dive angle, while expending 73 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill, resulting from the following projectile







Total Impacts : 39
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
There were three perforations into the transmission com-
partment, one of which (Impact 37) had no behind-the-plate
effects. Either of the other two perforations was capable of
causing an M-Kill. Impact 34 (Figure 51) perforated the left
hull armor and severed the steering control rod. Impact 36
(Figure 52) perforated the rear hull armor and penetrated the
transmission case. Cumulative damage to the track and suspen-
sioin system from 14 other impacts contributed to the kill.
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FIGURE 50. Impact Diagram, Target 29.
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FIGURE 51. Impact Thirty-Four, Target 29, Perforation of
Left Hull Armor Which Severed the Steering
Control Rod.
FIGURE 52. Impact Thirty-Six, Target 29, Perforat on




TARGET TANK NUMBER 30 DAMAGE SUMARY
!• Description :
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 30
with 50 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 228 degrees
(left rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 83 rounds.
2. Kill Assessment ;
100% M-Kill and 100% F-Kill, resulting from the following







Total Impacts : 50
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: This target suffered three perforations of the
hull and one other impact which were capable of causing an
M-Kill. Impact 30 (Figure 54) perforated the left hull
armor and penetrated the left fuel tank. Impact 34, shown
in Figures 55 and 56, respectively, perforated the left
hull armor and penetrated an oil cooler line. Impact 36
(Figure 58) perforated the rear hull armor and penetrated
the transmission case. Impact 47 (Figure 58) penetrated
the right final drive. Two other perforations (Impacts 35
and 39) into the engine compartment had no behind-the-
plate effects. Cumulative damage to the track and suspen-
sion system from seven other impacts contributed to the
kill (these included a possible perforation of the left
hull armor and penetration into the left fuel tank)
.
b. F-Kill: Impact 3 jammed the turret so that it could not
be traversed. Impact 8 perforated the tank commander cupo-
la and caused casualties to the tank commander and gunner.
Two other impacts contributed to the kill by penetrating
one wall of the gun tube, possibly jamming the turret.
64
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FIGURE 53. Impact Diagram, Target 30.
65
FIGURE 54. Impact Thirty, Target 30, Perforation of Bottom
Hull Armor and Penetration into Left Fuel Tank.
(Initial Impact was on Left Track Tension Idler
Wheel and Left Numhpr f> Rnarlwhpol i
FIGURE 55. Impact Thirty-Four, Target 30, Perforation of





FIGURE 56. Impact Thirty-Four, Target 30, Caused Penetra-
tion of Transmission Oil Cooler Line Behind
Armor
.
FIGURE 57 Impact Thirty-Six, Target 30, Perforation of
Left Hull Armor and Penetration into the
Transmission Case.
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FIGURE 58. Impact Forty-Seven, Target 30, Penetration into
the Right Final Drive.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 31 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description :
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 31
with 50 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 228 degrees
(left rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 82 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill and 100% F-Kill resulting from the following







Total Impacts : 50
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: This target suffered three perforations which
alone or together were capable of causing an M-Kill. Im-
pacts 21 and 30, shown in Figures 60 and 61, respectively,
perforated the left hull and penetrated the left fuel tank.
Impact 33 (Figure 61) perforated the left hull into the
engine compartment and penetrated the oil cooler space; if
the cooler had been in place it would have been damaged or
destroyed. One other perforation into the engine compart-
ment had no behind-the-plate effects. Cumulative damage
to the track and suspension system from 10 other impacts
contributed to the kill.
b. F-Kill: The F-Kill resulted from crew casualties attributed
to eight perforations (Impacts 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and
13) through the fighting compartment and from impact 14,
which jammed the turret, preventing it from traversing. Two
rounds of ammunition in the ready rack were impacted by pro-
jectile, spall or a large debris fragment from one or more
of the perforations (most likely Impacts 3, 6, or 7). The
damage to the warhead of round 7 in the ready rack was prob-
ably severe enough to detonate it causing a K-Kill if the
projectile had been filled with high explosive. (A mix of
kinetic and chemical energy rounds is normallv carried in
the ready rack. The warhead of the round impacted was inert
and reacted as an AP warhead. With a hit on the warhead of
an AP rounds there would not have been a K-Kill)
.
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FIGURE 59. Impact Diagram, Target 31.
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F I G u K£ b u . Impact Twenty-One, Target 31, Perforation
Hull ana Penetration into Left Fuel Tank.
FIGURE ol macts rhirt and Thirty-Three, Target 31,
impact JO Perforated the Hull Armor and
Penetrated the Left Fuel Tank. Impact 3 i








The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 32
with 18 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 237 degrees
(left rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 129 rounds.
2. Kill Assessment :
100% K-Kill, resulting from the following projectile







Total Imapacts : 18
**Omitted - Catastrophic fire and explosion overrode other
damages
.
3. Rationale for the fire Kill Assessment
Tank 32 was observed to oe burning immediately after the
attack; the fire probably was caused by Impact 17 (Figure 63)
which perforated the left hull and penetrated the left fuel
tank. The tank suffered three other perforations (Impacts 4,
5, and 10), which probably caused casualties to the tank com-
mander, gunner, loader and driver. One other perforation
(Impact 18) perforated the rear hull armor and penetrated the
transmission case, but made no apparent contribution to the
catastrophic kill. In the judgement of the Combat Damage
Assessment Team, the simultaneous outbreak of a major fire
and occurrence of four casualties would have prevented the
crew from effectively controlling the fire.
72
FIGURE 62. Impact Diagram, Target 32.
73
FIGURE 63. Impact Seventeen, Target 32, Perforation of the
Hull Armor and Penetration into the Left Fuel
Tank.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 3 3 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 33
with 33 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 232 degrees
(left rear) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 82 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
100% M-Kill and 95% F-Kill resulting from the following







Total Impacts : 33
Rationale f or Kill Assessment:
a. M-Kill:
were i
F-Kill: A 95% F-Kill was assessed based solely on crew
casualties (tank commander and gunner - Figures 67 and 68)
resulting from Impacts 6 and 8 which perforated the left






FIGURE 64. Impact Diagram, Target 33.
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FIGURE 65. Impact Twenty-Six, Target 33, Perforation of Brak
Adjust Access Door into Transmission Compartment.
FIGURE bb. mpact Twenty-Six, Target 33, Penetration of







FIGURE 67. Commander Manikin, Target 33, Showing Damage
from Impacts 6 and/or 8, which Perforated the Left
Side of the Turret.
FIGURE 68. Gunner Manikin, Target 33, Showing Damage from
Impacts 6 and/or 8, which Perforated the Left Side
of the Turret.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 34 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 4
with 16 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 246 degrees
(left side) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 92 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
100% F-Kill, resulting from the following projectile







Total Impacts : 16
Rationale for Kill Assessment ;
Impact 2 (Figure 70) hit between the turret and hull,
bulging the armor on the inside, and jammed the turret so that
it would not traverse. The perforation, shown in Figure 71,
Impact 7, penetrated into the bulkhead ammunition stowage rack
and into the adjacent stowage box, but did not impact any of
the stowed ammunition.
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NOTE: Roadwheels number 4 and 5 were hit on the right
hand side of the tank (Impact number 16) , and
are not shown in this view.
FIGURE 69. Impact Diagram, Target 34.
80
FIGURE 70. Impact Two, Target 34, Penetration of Turret Ring
between Hull and Turret, Armor Bulged, Turret
Jammed
.
FIGURE 71. Impact Seven, Target 34, Perforation of the Left
Hull Armor into the Bulkhead ammunition Stowage Area
81
TARGET TANK NUMBER 3 5 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 35
with 51 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 232 degrees
(left side) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 75 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
100% M-Kill and 100% F-Kill, resulting from the following







Total Impacts : 51
Rationale for Kill Assessment:
M-Kill: 100% M-Kill was due to crew casualties, shown in
Figures 73, 74, and 75. It was caused by perforations
into the fighting compartment from Impacts 2, 3, 6, 7, 8,
and 10, and by cumulative damage to the track and suspen-
sion system from twelve other impacts. One other perfora-
tion (Impact 37) into the transmission compartment had no
behind-the-plate effects.
F-Kill: 100% F-Kill was due to crew casualties, and to
Impact 9 (Figure 76) which perforated the top hull and













IMPACTS 38, 39 and 40 ON EXTENDED FUEL TANK BRACKET
NOTE: The number 46 was not used in identifying hits
FIGURE 72. Impact Diagram, Target 35.
83
FIGURE 73. Commander Manikin, Target 35, Snowing Damage from
Perforations into the Fighting Compartment.-
*•»>.
FIGURE 74. Gunner Manikin, Target 35 , Showing Damage from
Perforations into the Fighting Compartment.
34
-FIGURE 75. Loader Manikin, Target 35, Showing Damage from
Perforations into the Fighting Compartment.
FIGURE 76. Impact Nine, Target 35, Showing Perforation of
Top Hull Armor which Jammed the Turret.
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The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 36
with 50 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 333 degrees
(left front) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 97 rounds.
2. Kill Assessment ;
100% M-Kill, resulting from the following projectile






Total Impacts : 50
Rationale for Kill Assessment:
Major damage to the track and suspension system was caused
by Impact 30 (Figure 78) , which destroyed the left #2 road-
wheel hub and bearings; Impact 31 (Figure 79), which destroyed
the left #1 track support roller hub; and Impact 47 (Figure
80), which destroyed the left #5 roadwheel hub and bearings;
and by twenty-two other impacts, which inflicted a high level
of cumulative damage to the track and suspension system.
* IMPACT 14 ON LEFT BULLDOZER BLADE MOUNT
OPPOSITE SIDE INSIDE ROAD WHEEL
FIGURE 77. Impact Diagram, Target 36.
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FIGURE 78. Impact Thirty, Target 36, which Destroyed the Left
#2 Roadwheel Hub.
FIGURE 79. Impact Thirty-One, Target 36, which Damaged the




FIGURE 80. Impact Forty-Seven, Target 36, which Destroyed
the Left #5 Roadwheel Hub Bearings.
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The attacking A-1U aircraft impacted target tank number 37
with 43 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 325 degrees
(left front) during one pass at low altitude anu low dive
angle, while expending 72 rounds.
2 Kill Assessment :
8U% M-Kill and 100% F-Kill resulting from the following







Total Impacts : 43
3 . Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: Mobility was estimated to have been degraded 80%
by crew casualties and cumulative damage to the track and
suspension system. The crew casualties resulted from im-
pacts 9 and 19, and the cumulative track and suspension
damage from 13 other impacts including 27, 29, 20, 31, 32,
33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 40.
b. F-Kill: A 100% F-Kill was assessed because of Impact 8,
(Figure 82), which perforated the turret ring and jammed
the turret; Impact 9 (Figure 83), which perforated the
turret ring, jammed the turret, ignited propellant in an
ammunition round in the ready rack, and wounded two crew-
men (gunner and loader - Figures 84 and 85) and Impact 19,
which perforated the lip of the loaders hatch, contributing
to the loader casualty. One other perforation (Impact 23)
of the antenna base aperture made no contribution to the
kill. Two additional hits (Impacts 5 and 12) in the turret
ring may have contributed to the jammed turret.
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FIGURE 81. Impact Diagram, Target 37.
31
X. •
FIGURE 82. Impact Eight, Target 37, Perforations of Turret
Ring which Jammed Turret.
FIGURE 83. Impact Nine, Target 37, Perforations of Turret
Ring which Jammed Turret.
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FIGURE b4. Gunner Manikin, Target 37, Showing Damage from
Impact 9, Loader Fragment and burn Casualty.
*&&'{
FIGURE tf5. Loader Manikin, Target 37, Showing Damage from
Impacts 9 and 19
.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 38 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description :
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 3b
with 10 projectiles, fired from an aspect of 324 degrees (left
front) during one pass at low altitude and low dive angle,
while expending 89 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% interdiction M-Kill, resulting from the following





Total Imapcts : 10
Rationale for Kill Assessment:
A 100% interdiction type M-Kill after 5km travel was
assessed due to impact 10 (Figure 87) , which penetrated the
left final drive, causing an oil leak (Figure 88) and possibly
projectile and/or fragment damage to the gears. Minor track





FIGURE 86. Impact Diagram, Target 38.
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FIGURE 87. Impact Ten, Target 3a, Showing Initial Impact on the
Left #3 Track Support Roller.
flUF
FIGURE 88. Impact Ten, Target 38, Showing Penetration of the
Left Final Drive.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 39 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 39
with 30 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 327 degrees
(left front) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 100 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
100% interdiction M-Kill and 50% F-Kill, resulting from






Total Impacts : 30
Rationale for Kill Assessment ;
a. M-Kill: A 100% interdiction type M-Kill after 5km travel
was assessed because of Impact 24 (Figure 90) , which
destroyed the left #1 roadwheel hub, and because of
cumulative damage to the track and suspension system
resulting from 5 other impacts.
b. F-Kill: The F-Kill was attributed solely to crew
casualties. The tank commander was assessed a casualty
from glass fragments because of Impact 17, shown in Figure
91, which shattered a vision block in his cupola.
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•NEXT TO LAST ROAD WHEEL
FIGURE 89. Impact Diagram, Target 39
98
FIGURE 90. Impact Twenty-Four, Target 39, which Destroyed the
Left #1 Roadwheel Hub.
-"'-
...
FIGURE 91. Impact Seventeen, Target 39,





TARGET TANK TSIUMBER 4 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 40
with 71 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 320 degrees
(left front) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 100 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill, and 100% F-Kill, resulting from the following







Total Impacts : 71
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: Impact 2, shown in Figure 94, perforated the
driver's hatch cover, causing the driver to become a
casualty (Figure 95) . Impact 33 destroyed the left #1
roadwheel hub, shown in Figure 96. Impacts 42 and 45
destroyed the left #2 roadwheel hub, shown in Figure 97.
Impact 57 destroyed the left #3 roadwheel hub, shown in
Figure 98. Impact 61 destroyed the left #4 roadwheel hub,
shown in Figure 99. Impact 68 penetrated the left final
drive, shown in Figure 100. Impacts 39 and 40 destroyed
the left #1 track support roller, shown in Figures 101 and
102. Cumulative damage to the track and suspension system
from 19 other impacts contributed to the kill.
b. F-Kill: Impact 15, shown in Figure 103, perforated the
left side of the commander's cupola and made him a casu-
alty (Figure 104). Impact 3, shown in Figure 105, jammed
the turret so that it could not be traversed. Impacts 12
and 13, which destroyed the gunner's periscope head,
contributed to the kill.
100
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NOTE: Impacts 69, 70 and 71 not shown

















> . . ..*
FIGURE 95. Driver Manikin, Target 4U, Showing Damage from
Impact 2.
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FIGURE 96. Impact Thirty-Three, Target 4U, which Destroyed
the Left #1 Roadwheel Hub.
FIGURE 97. Impacts Forty-Two and Forty-Five, Target 40, which
Destroyed the Left #2 Roadwneel Hub.
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FIGURE 98. Impact Fifty-Seven, Target 40, which Destroyed
the Left #3 Roadwheel Hub.
FIGURE 99. Impact Sixty-One, Target 40, which Destroyed the
Left #4 Roadwheel Hub.
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FIGURE 100. Impact Sixty-Eight, Target 40, which Perforated
the Left Final Drive.
FIGURE 101. Impact Thirty-Nine, Target 40, which Destroyed
the Left #3 Track Support Roller.
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FIGURE 102. Impact Forty, Target 40, Contributor to Left
#3 Track Support Roller Damage.
'
FIGURE 103. Impact Fifteen, Target 40, which Perforated the
Left Side of the Commander's Cupola.
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46} A3
FIGURE 1U4. Commander Manikin, Target 40 , Showing Damage
from Impact 15.
LftlCTRIC
FIGURE 105. Impact Three, Target 40, which Jammed the Turret
so that it would not Traverse.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 41 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Descr iption ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 41
with 41 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 318 degrees
(left front) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 107 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
65% M-Kill, and 95% F-Kill, resulting from the following








Total Impacts : 41
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: Mobility was estimated to have been degraded by
65% due to crew casualties caused by Impact 18. Minor
damage to the track and suspension system, caused by
Impacts 27, 30, and 32, also made a contribution to the
kill.
b. F-Kill: A 95% F-Kill was assessed for Impact 18, shown in
Figure 107, which perforated the commander's cupola into
the fighting compartment and caused commander and gunner
casualties. Impact 11, which destroyed the range finder
blister, also made a significant contribution to the
kill.
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FIGURE 106. Impact Diagram, Target 41
110
FIGURE 107. Impact Eighteen, Target 41, Perforat





TARGET TANK NUMBER 4 2 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 42
with 23 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 303 degrees
(left front) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 101 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
100% interdiction M-Kill, resulting from the following






Total Impacts : 23 -
Rationale for Kill Assessment ;
A 100% interdiction type M-Kill, after an estimated 2000
meters travel, was assessed for Impacts 17 and 18, shown in
Figures 109 and 110, respectively, which destroyed two (2) end
connectors on opposite ends of the same track pins, leaving
only the track center guide to hold the track together.
Cumulative damage to the track and suspension system by 5




FIGURE 108. Impact Diagram, Target 42
113
FIGURE 1U9. Impact Seventeen, Target 42, Showing Destroyed
End Connector.




TARGET TANK NUMBER 43 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 43
with 30 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 313 degrees
(left front) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 70 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill and 100% F-Kill, resulting from the following







Total Impacts : 30
Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: Impacts 25 and 28 penetrated the left final
drive, shown in Figures 112 and 113, respectively. Impact
22 destroyed the left #6 roadwheel hub (Figure 114) .
Cumulative damage to the track and suspension system,
resulting from 10 other impacts, contributed to the kill.
b. F-Kill: Impact 3 (Figure 115) perforated the left front
turret, severed the recoil cylinder/replenisher flexible
hose, and wounded the tank commander and gunner (Figures
116 and 117). Four (4) other perforations of the hull had
little or no behind-the-plate effects.
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FIGURE 111. Impact Diagram, Target 43
116
FIGURE 112. Impact Twenty-Five, Target 43, Showing
of the Left Final Drive.
Penetration
FIGURE 113. Impact Twenty-Eight, Target 43, Showing Damage to
Left Inside Drive Sprocket and Penetration of
Left Final Drive.
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FIGURE 114. Impact Twenty-Two, Target 43, which Destroyed the
Left #6 Roadwheel Hub.
FIGURE 115. Impact Three, Target 43, which Pertoratea tne










FIGURE 117. Gunner Manikin, Target 43, Showing Damage from
Impact 3.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 44 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 44
with 13 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 322 degrees
(left front) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 60 rounds.
Kill Assessment :
100% M-Kill, and 95% F-Kill, resulting from the following




Total Impacts : 13
3. Rationale for Kill Assessment :
a. M-Kill: Impact 11 (Figure 119) perforated the left hull
and penetrated the oil cooler area; if the oil cooler had
been in place, it would have been damaged or destroyed.
Impact 12 ruptured the left final drive causing an oil
leak. One other impact on the track destroyed one track
center guide, making a minor contribution to the kill.
b. F-Kill: Impact 1 (Figure 120) perforated the left top of
the turret and caused casualties to two (2) crewmen (tank
commander and gunner) . No mechanical damage that would
contribute to an F-Kill was observed.
120
FIGURE 118. Impact Diagram, Target 44.
121
FIGURE 119 Impact Eleven, Target 44, which Perforated the
Left Hull Armor into the Engine Compartment.
*
FIGURE 120 Impact One, Target 44, which Perforated the
Left Top of the Turret and caused Commander and
Gunner Casualties.
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TARGET TANK NUMBER 4 5 DAMAGE SUMMARY
Description ;
The attacking A-10 aircraft impacted target tank number 45
with 55 projectiles, fired from an aspect angle of 322 degrees
(left front) during one pass at low altitude and low dive
angle, while expending 85 rounds.
Kill Assessment ;
100% M-Kill and 10% F-Kill, resulting from the following






Total Impacts : 55
Rationale for Kill Assessment ;
a. M-Kill: Impact 28 damaged the hub of the left #2 road-
wheel, causing a breach of the seal assembly. Impact 40
(Figure 122) destroyed the left #4 roadwheel hub. Impacts
37 and 38, shown in Figures 123 and 124, respectively,
destroyed the left #2 track support roller. Cumulative
damage to the track and suspension system from 15 other
impacts contributed to the kill.
b. F-Kill: Impact 1 (Figure 125) penetrated one wall of the
gun tube, degrading firepower by an estimated 10%.
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IMPACTS 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 14 ON BULLDOZER BLADE BRACKETS
NOTE: Not shown in the impact distribution drawing
above, but recorded in firing results are hits
number 3, 5, 6, 7 and 14 on bulldozer blade, and
its mounting bracketry and actuating hydraulic
cylinder.
FIGURE 121. Impact Diagram, Target 45.
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FIGURE 122. Impact Forty, Target 45, Severe Damage to Lett
#4 Roadwheel Hub, 1U0% Loss of Wheel.
FIGURE 123. Impact Thirty-Seven, Target 45, 10 oss of
Function of #2 Track Support Roll
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FIGURE 124. Impact Thirty-Eight, Target 45













FIGURE 125. Impact One, Target 45, Top of Gun Tube Wall
Perforated, Maximum Hole Dimension 37mm.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
On 2 February 1979, at Nellis AFB, Nevada, the Combat Damage
Assessment Team (CDAT) conducted firings of the A-10/GAU-8 weapon
system against an array of 31 tanks, simulating a Soviet tank bat-
talion deployed for an attack. The purpose of the firing test was
to evaluate the effects of the 30mm API anti-tank ammunition fired
out of the GAU-8 gun, under challenging conditions of engagement
for the A-10/GAU-8 system, against Soviet tank formations realis-
tically simulated by M-47 tanks stowed with main gun ammunition,
diesel fuel, lubricating oil, and crew manikins. The pilots of
the A-10 aircraft used in the firings conducted their attacks at
low altitudes and low dive angles thus simulating attack below the
minimum altitude for effective engagement by the opposing air
defense systems using acquisition and fire control radar.
The firing test can be summarized in terms of the following
data, collected and/or extracted from the firings:
Aircraft Parameters
1. Open-fire Speed (average). ------ 576 ft/sec
2. Altitude (average)- --------- 387 feet
3. Dive Angle (average)- -------- 3.23 degrees
4. Open-fire Slant Range (average) - - - 2820
5. Burst Length/Rounds fired (average) - 1.31 sec/86.4 rds
6. Number of Passes (primary)- ----- 30
7. Target attack Aspects (average):
"A" Company/ "B" Company, "C" Company,
Left front Right rear Left rear
(321 degrees) (153 degrees) (225 degrees)
Weapons Effects Target Damage
1. Rounds Fired- ----- -2592
2. Impacts --------- 919
3. Direct Hits ------- 601
4. Ricochets Off Ground- - - 235
5. Perforations ------ 83
1. K-Kills ------ 2
2. M+F-Kills ----- 5
3. M-Kills ------11
4. F-Kills ------ l
5. 100% M-Kills,
degraded F- - - - - 4
6. 100% F-Kills,
degraded M- - - - - 3
7. Degraded mobility
or firepower- - - - 3
8. Fired on but
missed- ------ 1
9. Not attacked- - - - 1
These data and the more detailed base from which they were
extracted can be arranged into measures of effectiveness for the
A-10/GAU-8 system under conditions similar to those in the firing
test, I.e., empirical combat simulation. The following values of
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effectiveness are based on the firing test of 2 February 1979:
Measures of Effectiveness
Accuracy Related Ratio Lethality Related Ratio:
Total Impacts (919 ) = 0.355 Perforations (83) = 0.092
Rounds Fired (2592) Total Impacts (919)
Direct Impacts (684) = 0.264 Perforations (83) = 0.121
Rounds Fired (2592) Direct Impacts (684)
Weapon System Effectiveness Ratio:
Tanks Neutralized (26) = 0.87 Tanks K-Killed (2) = 0.07
Passes (30) Passes (30)
The 30 target tanks were attacked from the left front, left
rear and right rear, and suffered the damage shown in Table I and
Table A-l.
The data and measures summarized above, and the other data
contained in this report, support the following inferences or
conclusions
:
1. The A-10/GAU-8 weapon system is capable, in realistic
simulation of combat, of inflicting catastrophic, M- , and F-Kills
on M-47 and similarly protected Soviet T-55 and T-62 main battle
tanks
.
2. The A-10/GAU-8 weapon system can effectively perforate the .
side and rear armor of the hulls and turrets of the M-47 and the simi-
larly protected Soviet T-55 and T-62 main battle tanks when firing
meduim to long burst* of 30mm API ammunition at low-level and medium
range. Perforations, to the virtual exclusion of all other types of
impacts by kinetic energy and shape charge projectiles, are those whic
cause catstrophic damage to main battle tanks by the ignition or deton
tion of internal fuel and ammunition. Given the substantial capabilit
of the A-10/GAU-8 weapon system to perforate the side and rear armor
of the more commonly fielded main battle tanks, the system allows the
aviation commander to develop doctrine and operational tactics to cata
strophically destroy main battle tanks.
3. The following test conditions resulted in extremelly conserv
tive results for the firings from the viewpoint of catastrophic kills:
a. Diesel fuel at ambient temperature and motionless.
b. Ammunition at ambient temperature.
c. Lubricating Oils at ambient temperature.
d. Ten out of 30 undesirable attack aspects from viewpoint
of both catastrophic and mobility kills (left front)
.
e. Twenty out of 30 undersirable attack aspects from view-
point of catastrophic kills (right and left rear)
.
* (0.65 to 1.92 seconds, containing 40 to 129 rounds)
** Below the Soviet radar acquisition thresholds.
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Uniqueness and Credibility of the Airborne Firing Tests
The test of 2 February 1979 had the purpose to verify the
acceptability of manufactureres ' lots of GAU-80 30mm API ammunition
when fired under operational conditions against the most invulnerable
and mobile Soviet ground weapon - the main battle tank. Acceptance
testing normally consists of firings of randomly selected ammunition
under carefully structured and instrumented range conditions to
verify muzzle velocity, chamber pressure, etc. For armor piercing
ammunition, tests would verify under range conditions the penetra-
tion/perforation capabilities of projectiles fired against armor
plate and other target materials. Such tests would be conducted
with scientific rigor (reproducibility) , would establish the tech-
nical characteristics of the ammunition-and-gun . system but have
little credibility from the viewpoint of the effectiveness of the
system as a damage agent against main battle tanks.
The sophisticated, painfully established models of tank
vulnerability were not satisfactory to estimate damage from a light
automatic cannon like the GAU-8 for the following reasons. The
Army models estimate damage based on single impacts by large pro-
jectiles fired from ground weapons. The synergistic effects of
numerous projectiles impacting almost simultaneously cannot be
estimated with such models nor can the effects of the small sub-
caliber depeleted Uranuim penetrators of the GAU-8 projectiles. No
credible mechanism exists in the present computer models to estimate
the number of impacts on target during one pass and the locations
of those impacts. Existing models estimate damage also based on
fragment impacts on inert internal components and liquids leaving
the effects on actual ammunition, fuel, oil, etc. open to question.
In the test of 2 February 1979, the CDAT laid out the unpre-
cedented number of 31 main battle tanks loaded with fuel, oil, live
propellant, and crew manikins and arranged in a U.S. Army-approved
attack formation simulating a Soviet tank battalion in a meeting
engagement with NATO forces in Central Europe. To simulate a
credible and challenging operational situation from the air,
Tactical Air Command and Systems Command representatives for the
firing agreed upon low altitude attack from over friendly territory
and initial passes at four simulated ZSU-23/4 air defense cannon
systems accompanying the simulated Soviet tank battalion in its
attack. The attacks would be made by five pilots of the 57th
Tactical Fighter using operational tactics involving low level in-
gress to the target area and initial long range, low level gunfire
attack against the ZSU-23/4 air defense cannon followed by medium
to short range gunfire attacks against the tanks. The pilots were
limited to one pass against each target and an overall time of ap-
proximately ten minutes over the entire tank battalion. The time
constraint was agreed upon to limit the exposure of the aircraft
to air defense fire by the tank air defense machine guns, small
arms, and a small number of SA-7 shoulder-fired missiles associated
with a reinforced Soviet tank battalion, and the possiblity of
attack by an overlapping missile system positioned farther to the
rear.
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The resulting test was unique insofar as it represented an
effective approximation of combat and therefore universal statisti-
cal results particularly from the viewpoint of the accuracy and
lethality of the GAU-8 API ammunition. The test was also unique
from the viewpoint of the scale of effort. The CDAT knows of no
testing conducted to date in the Free World in which 31 combat
loaded main battle tanks have been tactically arrayed and subjected
to significally free simulation of combat. The test team had to
accept certain shortcomings in realism, for example, air attack
within an arc of 180 degrees around the tanks and cease fire ranges
of approximately 2,000 feet for peacetime safety reasons. The
team additionally had to agree upon a scenario or single subopti-
mization of combat factors surrounding the placement of the Soviet
tank battalion on the simulated battlefield. Observed from a
slightly different perspective, the team was forced to attempt to
achieve universal statistical results within a set of simulated
combat factors which applied to ten minutes of aerial combat over
the leading battalion of a soviet tank regiment in a meeting en-
gagement in Central Europe. Yet, one is constrained to believe
that the results observed would repeat themselves in (1) similar




Graphic and Summary Data
Table A-l contains a summary of aircraft attack parameters
against target tank array 3 of 2 February 1979. Figure A-l
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The terms used in this report are defined below:
IMPACT -- Any evidence of a projectile strike against any portion
of the target. Ground richochets striking the target were
classified as "impacts".
PERFORATION — Any rupture of the armored envelope caused by an
impacting projectile which results in a complete rupture of an
armored surface by the projectile or spall fragments. A perfora-
tion can occur only when the armor is impacted, except in cases of
turret armor discontinuities around weapons, or vision and ranging
devices. The word "perforation" was deliberately selected to
avoid the ambiquities which may occur through use of the word
"penetration". Behind-the-plate effects may or may not result
from a perforation.
HIT -- Any impact not classified as a perforation.
MOBILITY KILL (M-KILL) — Loss of tactical mobility, resulting
from damage which cannot be repaired by the crew on the battle-
field. A tank is considered to have sustained a 100% M-Kill when
it is no longer capable of executing controlled movement on the
battlefield. Mobility is DEGRADED when a tank can no longer
maintain position in its formation.
CATASTROPHIC KILL (K-KILL) — A tank is considered to have sus-
tained a K-Kill when both an M-Kill and a F-Kill have occurred as
the result of killing fires and explosions from ignited fuel
and/or ammunition. A tank which has suffered a K-Kill is consi-
dered not to be economically repairable and, by U.S. standards,
would be abandoned on the battlefield.
ATTACK ASPECT — The angle of approach of the aircraft with
respect to the orientation of the tank with zero degrees repre-
senting the front of the tank (gun forward) and 180 degrees
representing the rear of the tank.
SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS -- Impacts which damage systems, components or
sub-systems resulting in their destruction or partial loss of func-
tion. This type of damage contributes to the assessea kill.
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INSIGNIFICANT IMPACTS — Impacts which damage non-critical struc-
tural, convenience, or accessory components and which may result
in their destruction or partial loss of function, but with no im-
pact on mobility or firepower considerations. Good maintenance
practices contemplate repair or replacement of such items at the
earliest opportunity consistent with accomplishment of the
mission.
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